This article investigates the socio-economic causes that have led to the recent political instability in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. The MENA region is characterised as one which holds massive hydrocarbon resources and yet suffers from low economic growth and development and high levels of unemployment. This article shows that the Arab uprisings are linked to the inequalities created by the opening up of the Arab countries to foreign capital and financial agencies, a project that is commonly referred to as Washington Consensus. This neo-liberal globalisation programme has been highly diverse in its effectiveness throughout the MENA region. However the state still remains the dominant economic player in this region and the Arab population still regards it as the primary provider. The state has been able to hold on to its power by limiting the role of private enterprise and also by maintaining an exclusive nexus between itself and the few prominent private sector companies. Although the wave of disillusionment and frustration amongst the Arab youth washed over the entire region with the same passion and propensity, the reaction of individual governments has been very varied. The future of the region lies in how effectively and efficiently the interim or newly elected governments are able to move their country beyond the pincers of, on the one hand, the Washington Consensus and, on the other, the old, state-centric and inefficient developmental regime.
Introduction
The current political turmoil in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region has brought 'democratisation' and 'economic liberalisation' to the forefront of political debate. The dramatic political developments since December 2010 have created uncertainty over future economic policy and reform in the MENA region 1 . Transitional governments in countries affected by the Arab Spring are working on a mandate to deliver greater political and economic accountability and transparency to ensure sustainable macroeconomic growth and political stability. There is still a considerable amount of uncertainty and debate as to whether the Arab nations that had embarked on market driven economic reform in the 1990s, in line with the Washington Consensus, will continue on the same path or if the political transition triggered by the Arab Spring will force them to take an alternative route to economic growth. Furthermore, although the Arab Spring provides an unprecedented opportunity for political, economic and social reform in the long term its immediate impact has been devastating, characterised by social unrest, sectarian violence, massive displacement of communities and deterioration of living standards in general 2 .
The countries belonging to the MENA region are hugely diverse at multiple levels such as history, population size, resources, policy and ideological orientation however they have several unifying characteristics 3 . First, they all have similar demographic profiles characterised by a disproportionately large youth population -'youth bulge'. The median age in Arab countries is 25, the second lowest in the world, with only Sub-Saharan African countries being younger 4 . Second, all countries within the MENA region have a dominant public sector. Third, the main source of revenue for these countries comes from rents derived from oil and other hydrocarbons, international aid or remittances from abroad.
Fourth, political power in these countries is concentrated in the hands of few, inasmuch as a robust civil society is absent and Islam plays an important role in the articulation between the public and the private sphere. The Arab uprisings have had very wide ranging impact in the region with some governments resorting to appeasement through increased subsidies and welfare and political reform while in a handful of countries the political elite have taken an extreme hard-line stance to remain in power.
Over the past few decades, the economic development strategies adopted by the MENA countries follow a path similar to most developing countries. From the 1950s to the mid1980s the development strategy comprised of Import Substituting Industrialisation (ISI) policies which included strict controls on international trade, overvalued exchange rates and government controlled foreign exchange and credit markets 5 . The objective of such a strategy was to develop capital intensive domestic industry producing goods and services in a highly protected business environment for domestic market consumption. This strategy resulted in the proliferation of large state owned companies operating in uncompetitive and inefficient markets. The private sector benefitted from government subsidies in the form of discounted prices of intermediate goods, cheap credit foreign exchange and import licenses.
Overall, the result was as an economic system where the state was the dominant player and private sector was virtually non-existent. During this period the economic performance across countries in this region was mainly influenced by volatile oil prices. The hike in oil prices in 1973 and 1979 led to rapid improvements in growth and development indicators within this region. The collapse of oil prices in the 1980s and 1990s has led to significant reversal in economic growth and prosperity. Since the 1990s many MENA countries have embraced market-led, outward looking economic reform by adopting the structural adjustment programmes (SAP) introduced by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. These reforms were based on the neo-liberal policies prescribed in the Washington consensus which encouraged trade liberalisation, fiscal discipline and privatesector driven growth.
The objective of the paper is to review the recent economic developments and prospects of the MENA region in light of the policies outlined in the 'Washington Consensus' and the implications of the Arab uprising on short term economic performance and policy. The paper is divided into three sections. The first section defines the Washington Consensus, focussing on global impact of policy reforms and the 'post Washington Consensus', which was an effort to address inadequacies of neo-liberal globalisation innate in the term. The second section is a review of the economic performance and development of the MENA region before the Arab uprising in 2010 and how successfully countries within this region were able to adopt and implement the Washington Consensus policies. The third section links up the impact of reforms, driven by the neo-liberal policies of the Washington Consensus, upon social classes and categories, thus deciphering the cause of the Arab Spring in certain countries of the MENA region.
Washington Consensus
The Washington Consensus was a set of economic policies following a term introduced by the English economist, John Williamson, in 1989 and in response to the Latin American experience during the 1980s and 1990s. Post-Allende Chile, in fact, was the first country in the 1970s, and well before Thatcher's Britain, that experienced the key tenets of Washington consensus (privatizations, liberalisation of financial and banking system, welfare cuts and so on). Latin American countries were struggling to overcome devastating debt crisis, triple digit hyperinflation and balance of payments problem. Government spending was very high, monetary and fiscal policies were unstable and the weak central banks were unable to control unsustainable credit expansions 6 . Export competitiveness was stifled by overvalued currencies and unsustainable exchange rate policies leading to ever-widening trade gap.
The 1980s were the famous lost decade when Latin American countries experienced stagflation and decline in per capita income 7 . In light of the Latin American crisis the Washington Consensus formulated a set of policy agenda that were agreed by policy makers in Washington DC i.e. the U.S. Treasury, the IMF and the World Bank as a policy basis for developing countries. The Consensus included a list of policy reforms shown in table 1. Neoliberal economists such as Lal, Little, Krueger and Bauer argued that market-led short term efficiencies would lead to long term growth. They believed that long term economic growth was the only way to achieve the key development goals of poverty reduction and welfare enhancement and that growth could be achieved through market driven economic policies by ensuring the most efficient allocation of resources. Empirical analysis reinforced his conviction that 'market failure' in itself did not justify government intervention and that 'bureaucratic failure', more likely to be prevalent in less developed economies, would only make matters worse. He proposed the slogan 'Get the prices right !' and ardently opposed economic policy that encouraged 'political pricing' most commonly manifested in developing countries with artificially maintained high exchange rates, government controlled interest rates, subsidised agricultural products and import tariffs on luxury and consumer goods 12 .
The concept of 'poverty traps' based on the notion that poverty and stagnation were selfperpetuating and that foreign aid was the only way that the poorer economies could escape this trap was completely dismissed by Bauer and other neo-classical economists 13 . Implicit in the Washington Consensus was a structural approach to poverty eradication should be based on based on increased returns on factor endowments and increased capital . However the pattern of inequality in most Latin American and South East Asian countries do not seem to follow the inverted U-shape of the Kuznets curve. Empirical evidence seems to be inconclusive highlighting the fact that not all development paths will be characterised by the Kuznets curve. These discrepancies may be due to the differing political factors and regional instabilities. In some cases countries development induces increasing inequality causing social unrest and forced democratisation. These countries will be more likely to encourage institutional reform and redistribution of wealth. However countries where development is linked to undemocratic paths show patterns inconsistent with Kuznets either because development does not lead to rising inequality -the case of the 'East Asian Miracle' or because of low levels of political mobilisation.
Post Washington Consensus
Although policy reforms propagated by the Washington Consensus were broadly embraced by Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, MENA region and East Asia they have were unable to produce the desired results in majority of these countries. Per capita GDP growth in Latin America has been below expectations and short-lived, rising from 0. . This gave birth to the 'Augmented Washington Consensus' that included a list of reforms that were focused on institutional reforms ( Table 1 ). The realisation was that the stabilisation, liberalisation and privatisation policy reforms would not be sustainable if institutional conditions were poor. Strong governance, rule of law, political equality, social justice and economic efficiency were the key elements to long term sustainable growth . By the early 1990s nearly all MENA economies followed suit. These structural adjustment programmes included neo-liberal reforms that were in line with the Washington Consensus guidelines.
The objective was to promote growth and prosperity in the region by opening up the political economies and integrating them into global markets 29 . Pre-1990 development strategies had led to inward-looking, state led economic systems that were unable to compete in the global market. The economic fortunes of this region were, and still are, heavily reliant on rents derived from fuel exports, international aid and remittances resulting in volatile and unsustainable long term growth. Reforms were introduced to dismantle the system of centralised bureaucratic control and to promote a market-driven economy with a strong private sector and an increased focus on international trade liberalisation. This section of the paper will be concentrating on the impact of these reforms on the economic performance of this region.
The MENA region may be characterised as one which holds massive hydrocarbon resources and yet suffers from low economic growth and development and high levels of 
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Any analysis of the economic performance of this region will be done in the context of these three distinct groups in mind.
The economic performance in terms of GDP growth shows a positive trend in the MENA region, rising from 3.5% in the late 1990s to 6.3% in 2006 and 3.4% in 2011 (Table 2) .
Although there has been a significant improvement in the overall GDP growth in the region 
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Although the MENA region has experienced positive GDP growth rates since the mid-1990s this has not been reflected in the GDP per capita growth rates in the region. This is because the population has grown faster in this region than the GDP. Between 2000 and 2010 the annual average GDP growth rate was 4.8% however in the same the per capita GDP grew by only 2.5%.
Source: Authors calculations based on World Bank and IMF-IFS data base.
The gap between the GDP and per capita GDP in this region is very high, second only to the 
Conclusion
The paper has tried to demonstrate that the economic success in the region has been mostly confined to the RRLI countries with vast reserves of hydrocarbon resources. These countries have been able to invest their fiscal reserves in infrastructure projects and in subsidising fuel and food prices. This group of countries have also been the able to attract considerable amount of investment from abroad. Economic success in RRLA countries has also been driven by fuel resources and remittances from abroad making them highly susceptible to international oil prices and labour market fluctuations. The economic performance of the RPLA countries has been heavily reliant on foreign aid and labour remittance from abroad.
Tied in with the aid and investment are conditions imposed by donor countries and institutions insisting on structural changes in goods, labour and capital markets. These conditions impose restrictions on the size and role of the governments in these countries.
Evidence over the past couple of decades shows that these structural changes have been implemented in the MENA countries at different rates and with different degrees of success.
The state still remains the dominant economic player in this region and the Arab population still regards it as the primary provider. The state has been able to hold on to its power by limiting the role of private enterprise and also by maintaining an exclusive nexus between the state and the few prominent private sector companies.
My research also shows that the Arab uprisings are linked to the inequalities created by the opening up of the Arab countries to foreign capital and financial agencies, a project that is commonly called as Washington Consensus. This neo-liberal globalisation programme has been highly diverse in its effectiveness throughout the MENA region. Although the wave of disillusionment and frustration amongst the Arab youth washed over the entire region with the same passion and propensity, the reaction of individual governments has been very varied. The RRLI and RRLA (with the exception of Libya and Syria) countries, namely the GCC governments followed the road of appeasement, promising more economic concessions in the form of more jobs, higher wages and low food and fuel prices. It is interesting to see that negligible political concessions have been made. In the RPLA countries of Egypt and Tunisia the political change has been more radical and drastic with very few economic reforms. The resource rich governments have been able to control the uprising through economic concessions and in some cases intimidation whereas the resource poor governments have not been able to make such economic promises and despite military deployment have fallen in the face of these uprisings.
The future of the region lies in how effectively and efficiently the interim or newly elected governments are able to implement the political and economic changes they have promised in their election manifestoes, and how able they will be to move their country beyond the pincers of, on the one hand, the Washington Consensus and, on the other, the old, statecentric and inefficient developmental regime.
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